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DRAFTING MEDIATION PRIVILEGES:
LESSONS FROM THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT
Michael A. Perino*
INTRODUCTION
Mediation confidentiality provisions or privileges are now
prevalent throughout the United States. Forty-one states have en-
acted some form of mediation privilege.' As part of the Adminis-
trative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990,2 Congress enacted
legislation to protect confidentiality in mediations involving fed-
eral agencies.' An additional source for such provisions is the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA),4 which required each federal
district court to implement a civil justice expense and delay reduc-
tion plan (Plan(s)) by the end of 1993. Those Plans seek to imple-
ment mechanisms designed to address causes of excessive expense
and delay in the federal courts.
A number of the Plans formulated by the district courts in-
clude court-annexed alternative dispute resolution (ADR) pro-
grams, one of the main delay and expense reduction techniques
which Congress sought to have the districts consider. A significant
number of districts have implemented mediation programs.5
These mediation programs vary widely in the confidentiality pro-
tection offered to mediation proceedings.
This Article analyzes the Plans and local court rules of a
number of districts to demonstrate some of the problems that can
arise when drafting mediation privileges. Section I reviews the pro-
visions of the CJRA pursuant to which some of the districts promul-
* Associate, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, New York. B.A. 1985, Rutgers Col-
lege; J.D., 1988 Boston College Law School; LL.M. 1995, Columbia University School
of Law. The author would like to thank Carol Liebman and David Geronemus for
their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1 NANcY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAw, PoLIcY, PRAcTICE
§ 9:33 n.1 (2d ed. 1994).
2 5 U.S.C. §§ 571 to 593 (Supp. IV 1992). The Act contains a sunset provision
effective October 1, 1995. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-552, § 11, 104 Stat. 2738 (1990).
3 5 U.S.C. § 574.
4 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. V 1994); see also S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 6802, 6804.
5 Some of these mediation programs antedate the CJRA. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT.
W. DIsT. OF WASH. LocAL R. 39.1.
SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
gated confidentiality provisions. Section II discusses the
importance of confidentiality provisions in mediation programs
and evaluates some of the objections that have been lodged against
creating mediation privileges. Section III then reviews the confi-
dentiality provisions that exist in various court-annexed mediation
programs in light of these objections and raises questions about
the scope and wording of those provisions. Finally, Section IV sug-
gests a possible alternative to the types of confidentiality provisions
that currently exist in these court-annexed mediation programs.
I. THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990
Congress enacted the CJRA to address the problems of exces-
sive cost and delay in prosecuting civil litigation.' By passing the
CJRA, Congress sought to revive the promise of Rule 1 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, which is to "secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action." Congress felt that
"[b]y improving the quality of the process of civil litigation, [the
CJRA would] contribute to improvement of the quality of justice
that the civil justice system delivers."7
Congress found that all users of the federal courts, as well as
the courts themselves, shared responsibility for these problems of
excessive cost and delay.8 The CJRA reflects a policyjudgment that
reform is best achieved from the bottom up - with "users of the
Federal court system [ ] playing a principal role in the formulation
of effective civil justice expense and delay reduction plans."9 Thus,
the CJRA sought to enlist all participants in federal court litigation
to formulate solutions to these problems. In "identifying, develop-
ing and implementing solutions to problems of cost and delay,"
Congress found that consultation among these groups would effec-
tively promote communication of techniques for litigation manage-
6 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102(2), 104 Stat. 5089
(1990).
7 S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N.
6804.
8 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102(2), 104 Stat. 5089
(1990). Specifically, Congress found that:
The courts, the litigants, the litigants' attorneys, and the Congress and
the executive branch, share responsibility for cost and delay in civil liti-
gation and its impact on access to the courts, adjudication of cases on
the merits, and the ability of the civil justice system to provide proper
and timely judicial relief for aggrieved parties.
Id.
9 S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N.
6806.
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ment and cost and delay reduction.' 0 In other Words, Congress
determined that the best ideas for civil justice reform were likely to
come from those persons who dealt with the problems on a day-to-
day basis and who had the practical experience to evaluate which
proposals would be most effective."
To tap this resource, each district was required to form advi-
sory committees consisting of attorneys and other persons who are
representative of major categories of litigants in the district. Each
district court, in consultation with its advisory committee, was re-
quired to implement a Plan to reduce civil justice expense and de-
lay. " Specifically, Congress required the districts to formulate
Plans to "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the mer-
its, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure
just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes."'" Dis-
tricts could either adopt their own Plan or a model Plan developed
by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Each advisory
group was required to assess thoroughly the court's civil and crimi-
nal dockets in formulating the Plan. Accordingly, each district was
to address problems peculiar to its own docket. 4
The CJRA required the districts and advisory committees to
10 Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102(4).
11 S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), 14-16, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CA.N. 6806, 6817-19.
12 In addition to requiring each district to formulate a Plan, the CJRA created
three additional layers of experimentation: (a) demonstration programs; (b) early
implementation districts ("Emls"); and (c) pilot programs. Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§§ 103, 104. EIDs are district courts that developed and completed plans on an expe-
dited basis (i.e., between six and twelve months after the CJRA was enacted). Id. at
§ 103(c)(1); S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CA.N. 6804, 6853. Congress. created the EIDs to "encourag[e] district courts
and advisory groups to implement their plans with all deliberate speed, without forc-
ing them to move so rapidly so as to undermine the spirit of the legislation." S. REP.
No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 6804, 6853.
Those EIDs that drafted mediation confidentiality provisions are included in the anal-
ysis of confidentiality provisions contained in Section III. An evaluation of the pilot
and demonstration programs is beyond the scope of this article.
13 28 U.S.C. § 471.
14 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1). In particular, Congress directed each advisory group to:
(A) determine the condition of the civil and criminal dockets;
(B) identify trends in case filings and in the demands being placed on
the court's resources;
(C) identify the principal causes of cost and delay in civil litigation, giv-
ing consideration to such potential causes as court procedures and the
ways in which litigants and their attorneys approach and conduct litiga-
tion; and
(D) examine the extent to which costs and delays could be reduced by a
better assessment of the impact of new legislation on the courts.
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engage in a program of experimentation, but the advisory groups
were not left entirely to their own devices. Although it encouraged
innovation, Congress provided some broad guidelines. For exam-
ple, Congress found that "an effective litigation management and
cost and delay reduction program should incorporate several inter-
related principles."15 As a result, the CJRA mandated that the dis-
tricts consider a number of proven cost and delay reduction
techniques. In this way, Congress sought to "promulgate[ ] a na-
tional strategy and national framework for attacking the cost and
delay problem." 16
Among the cost and delay reduction techniques each district
and advisory group were to consider was the use of ADR.17 Indeed,
"expanding and enhancing the use of [ADR]" is one of the "six
essential components" upon which the CJRA is said to be built. 8
This emphasis on ADR recognizes that "no single method of dis-
pute resolution" is ideal for all types of cases.' 9 Instead, an ideal
system will deploy "a whole battery of dispute-resolving mecha-
nisms, variously directed, variously driven and variously em-
ployed."20 To realize these goals, districts formulating their Plans
were required to consider authorizing the referral of appropriate
cases to ADR programs that were either previously designated in
the district or that the court may choose to make available. Con-
gress specifically enumerated "mediation, minitrial, and summary
jury trial" as appropriate ADR techniques.2'
15 Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102(5).
16 S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6802, 6804.
17 Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102(5)(D).
18 S. lEP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N.
6804, 6817. The Senate Report stated that the CJRA:
is built upon six essential components aimed at improving litigation
management and reducing litigation costs and delays. Briefly, those
principles are:
(1) building reform from the "bottom up";
(2) promulgating a national, statutory policy in support ofjudicial case
management;
(3) imposing greater controls on the discovery process;
(4) establishing differentiated case management systems;
(5) improving motions practice and reducing undue delays associated
with decisions on motions; and
(6) expanding and enhancing the use of alternative dispute resolution.
Id.
'9 Id. at 27-28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 6804, 6830-31 (quoting Maurice Ro-
senberg, Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversary Justice?, 21 CREI roN L. REv.
801, 806 (1988)).
20 Id.
21 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (6) (B).
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The CJRA gave the districts no further guidance on how to
design, implement, or administer their ADR programs. Not sur-
prisingly, the programs implemented under the Plans (and the
programs that antedate the CJRA) differ widely from one another.
Indeed, this may well be the result Congress sought to achieve
under the CJRA. The key to the CJRA was "decentralization."22
The "principles and guidelines" contained in the CJRA only pro-
vide broad categories for each advisory group to consider.21 Con-
gress did not mandate that districts adopt any particular technique.
Moreover, the advisory group's recommendations were to take into
account the particular problems and issues the individual districts
faced.24 Through this structure, Congress essentially sought to cre-
ate ninety-four laboratories for civiljustice reform, with ninety-four
different experiments. Such experimentation was considered to be
the "heart" of the CJRA.25
This experimentation resulted in numerous diverse programs.
For instance, federal court mediation programs differ in the extent
to which communications made during mediation proceedings are
protected from subsequent disclosure. Before discussing these spe-
cific differences, this Article will first discuss the importance of
such protection in promoting successful mediation outcomes.
II. CONFIDENTiALrIY IN MEDIATION
While most experts agree that some form of mediation confi-
dentiality26 is necessary, defining the parameters of such protec-
tions has led to much debate and disagreement.27  This
22 S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6806, 6817.
23 28 U.S.C. § 473.
24 28 U.S.C. § 472(c) (2).
25 S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N.
6804, 6818; see Carl Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R-D. 49, 49
(1992).
26 Folberg and Taylor distinguish between two different kinds of confidentiality:
privacy from public disclosure and privilege against court testimony. JAY FOLBERG &
ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIAnON 264 (1984). Privacy from public disclosure means that
"[m]ediators are bound not to discuss with other people what is revealed to them in
the mediation unless such revelations are agreed to by the participants or compelled
by a court order or statute." Id. By contrast, privilege involves the circumstances spec-
ified by case law, rule, or statute that entitle the mediator or the mediation participant
to refuse to disclose comments made during the mediation or to produce documents
prepared for the mediation. Id. This paper uses confidentiality in the latter, legal
sense.
27 See Michael L. Prigoff, Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality in Medi-
ation, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 1 (1988); Jonathan M. Hyman, The Model Mediator
Confidentiality Rule: A Commentary, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 17 (1988).
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disagreement is not surprising given the directly competing policy
arguments involved in any mediation confidentiality provision.
The importance of confidentiality in mediation derives di-
rectly from the nature of the mediation process. In mediation, a
neutral third party assists the disputing parties in negotiations
aimed at achieving a settlement. Mediation differs from adjudica-
tion and some other forms of ADR because the mediator has no
power to compel testimony or the production of evidence. Nor
does the mediator issue a ruling based on the presentations of the
parties. Instead, the mediator acts as a facilitator to help the par-
ties reach voluntary agreements. The mediator assists the parties
through techniques designed to circumvent the strategic, cogni-
tive, and other barriers that often impede negotiations. 8
For the process to work, it is essential for the mediator to en-
courage the parties to discuss candidly with her all of the relevant
issues, especially those that may be impeding settlement.29 To help
the parties resolve their dispute, the mediator must be able to eval-
uate the parties' real motives and interests.3 0 The mediation pro-
cess involves drawing out of the parties a list of all relevant issues
and encouraging compromise and accommodation.3 1 The media-
tor's ability to assure that facts conveyed to her will remain confi-
dential aids this process.3 2 Indeed, as one commentator has noted,
mediation becomes "impossible if the parties [are] constantly look-
ing over their shoulders."3 3
The participants, of course, need to be candid with each other
as well as with the mediator. Such candor is facilitated by a credi-
28 Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolu-
tion of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST.J. DIsp. RESOL. 235, 248 (1993).
29 CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLCT 158-62 (1986); FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 263-65 (rec-
ommending that a mediator fully describe mediation procedures, such as the extent
of confidentiality and the logistics of the process, in addition to anwering questions
from the parties); see United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
30 Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARv. L. REv. 441, 445 (1984)
(hereinafter "Protecting Confidentiality").
31 See Prigoff, supra note 27, at 1; Mnookin, supra note 28, at 248; cf. EEOC v.
Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 601 (1981) (footnote omitted) (comment-
ing that informal conciliation is more likely to succeed when a party "has enough
information to be able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of his opponent's case
as well as his own").
32 Eileen P. Friedman, Protection of Confidentiality in the Mediation of Minor Disputes,
11 CAP. U. L. REv. 181, 196-97 (1981).
33 See Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The
Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. DIsP. RESOL. 37, 38 (1986).
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ble and consistent application of a mediation privilege. In a
slightly different context, the Second Circuit found that:
The guarantee of confidentiality permits and encourages coun-
sel to discuss matters in an uninhibited fashion .... If partici-
pants cannot rely on the confidential treatment of everything
that transpires during these sessions then counsel of necessity
will feel constrained to conduct themselves in a cautious, tight-
lipped, non-committal manner more suitable to a poker game
than to adversaries attempting to arrive at a just resolution of a
civil dispute. This atmosphere if allowed to exist would surely
destroy the effectiveness of [the] program...."
Confidentiality is particularly important in court-annexed pro-
grams, where parties may fear that if they do not reach a resolution
of their dispute, anything they say may be reported back to the
court. But such protections are necessary in any mediation. A suc-
cessful mediation may require the parties to admit facts that would
be adverse to their positions if the mediation failed and litigation
ensued.35 An apology might also pave the way toward resolving the
dispute.3 6 Absent some sort of confidentiality provision, such state-
ments may be admissible in subsequent litigation. 7 For this rea-
son, one or both parties may be reluctant to disclose information
or admit fault, thereby undermining the prospects of a successful
mediation." A privilege protecting communications from disclo-
sure would tend to eliminate such wariness.
3 9
34 Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 929-30 (2d
Cir. 1979) (discussing mandatory preargument settlement conferences pursuant to
the court's Civil Appeals Management Plan); see United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp.
99, 104 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (explaining that a privilege serves to ensure the effectiveness
of mediation programs).
35 FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 264-65.
36 STEPHEN GOLDBERG, ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 137-39 (2d ed. 1992).
37 Id. at 138; see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). Of course, it is possible that the state-
ments may be inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 408 or other similar state
rules which prohibit admission of certain statements made during compromise nego-
tiations. As discussed infra, however, Rule 408 may not provide broad enough
protection.
38 FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 265. The Fifth Circuit made this point
plain in Branch v. Phillips Petroleum, 638 F.2d 873, 881 (5th Cir. 1981). In that case,
the court prohibited discovery of information from an EEOC conciliation proceeding
because the prospect of disclosure would discourage negotiated settlements and
thereby undermine the congressional policy favoring unlitigated resolution of em-
ployment discrimination claims. As the court noted, "the prospect of disclosure or
the possible admission into evidence of proposals made during conciliation efforts
would tend to inhibit the kind of free and open communication necessary to achieve
unlitigated compliance with the requirements of Title VII." Id.
39 Protecting Confidentiality, supra note 30, at 445. Confidentiality also helps to pro-
mote full disclosure of information when the mediation involves particularly sensitive
1995]
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Alternatively, some parties may be participating in mediation
with the expectation that nothing they say will be binding on
them.40 This may be especially true where parties to a mediation
are unsophisticated or where the parties are not represented by
counsel. 41 The mediator's assurances concerning confidentiality
may foster an unwarranted sense of security concerning the scope
of protection from disclosure.42 Confidentiality may also prevent a
sophisticated party from using mediation as an additional form of
discovery or from otherwise taking advantage of the naivete of an-
other party.43
Some commentators have suggested that it is somewhat circu-
lar to argue that a mediation privilege should be based on the par-
ties' expectations when their expectations may be the result of
nothing more than the mediator's assurances of confidentiality.4
This view is not necessarily correct. Court-conducted settlement
proceedings (which arguably include court-sponsored mediation)
have historically been confidential in that they are closed to the
press and public.45 Moreover, if courts are intent on addressing
perceived civil justice reform problems through the implementa-
tion of court-annexed mediation programs, then they should de-
sign programs based upon both the reasonable expectations of the
users of those programs and the considered judgments of experts
in these dispute resolution techniques as to what features are nec-
essary to make the programs function properly.
In addition to the salutary effects with respect to the parties,
issues. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305, 309
(1971).
40 See Prigoff, supra note 27, at 2; Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 33, at 42.
41 See Prigoff, supra note 27, at 2.
42 Of course, mediators should disclose that they may be compelled by court order
to testify. See MooRE, supra note 29, at 160.
43 Prigoff, supra note 27, at 2; ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 1, at § 9:03; Philip J.
Harter, Neither Cop Nor Collection Agent: Encouraging Administrative Settlements By Ensur-
ing Mediator Confidentiality, 41 ADMIN. L. REv. 315, 324 (1989).
An important consideration for the drafters of Federal Rule of Evidence 408,
which excludes certain uses of evidence related to compromises and offers to compro-
mise, was to protect against such imbalances. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
10 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7057 (rejecting the common law rule
that statements made during negotiations were admissible unless hypothetically stated
to be without prejudice because "protecting hypothetical phrased statements ... con-
stituted a preference for the sophisticated, and a trap for the unwary"). Rule 408 is
discussed further, below. See infra notes 70-87 and accompanying text.
44 See Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. DisP.
RESOL. 1, 32 (1986).
45 Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 903-04 (6th Cir.
1988) (discussing summary jury trials).
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confidentiality also protects the mediator's status as a neutral,46 a
key component in mediation programs. 47 Unlike some other privi-
leges, such as the attorney-client privilege, the nature and purpose
of a mediation privilege requires that the mediator be permitted to
invoke a privilege in at least some situations where all the parties to
the mediation have waived confidentiality.48 The reason for this
rule should not be, as some have argued,49 that the privilege is nec-
essary to protect the mediator from the burdens of testifying. Such
matters of convenience do not outweigh the important public pol-
icy in favor of requiring those with relevant evidence to testify or to
be subject to discovery.' °
Instead, allowing the mediator to control the privilege with re-
spect to obtaining documents or testimony from her appears to be
necessary to promote the use of mediation (especially court-an-
nexed mediation) as a viable dispute resolution technique. Before
parties will divulge information to the mediator, they must believe
that the mediator is neutral and that disclosures will not harm their
positions."' A mediator's neutrality may appear to be compro-
mised where the mediation has not been successful and one of the
parties attempts to use the mediator's testimony to further their
subsequent litigation efforts. If the mediator is subpoenaed and
forced to testify, the great likelihood is that her testimony will aid
46 Jay Folberg, Confidentiality and Privilege in Divorce Mediation, in DIVORCE MEDIA-
TION: THEORY AND PRAcrICE 319, 319 (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne, eds., 1988); Protecting
Confidentiality, supra note 30, at 445-46 (footnote omitted).
47 Friedman, supra note 32, at 198.
48 See 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
503(c) (01] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1995) (discussing the attorney-client privi-
lege); Henderson v. United States, 815 F.2d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that
the "attorney-client privilege belongs to and exists solely for the benefit of the
client").
49 Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 33, at 38; see Hyman, supra note 27, at 21.
50 Jeremy Bentham aptly made this point:
Are men of the first rank and consideration-are men high in office-
men whose time is not less valuable to the public than to themselves-
are such men to be forced to quit their business, their functions, and
what is more than all, their pleasure, at the beck of every idle or mali-
cious adversary, to dance attendance upon every petty cause? Yes, as far
as it is necessary, they and everybody.... Were the Prince of Wales, the
Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Lord High Chancellor, to be passing
by in the same coach, while a chimney-sweeper and a barrow-woman
were in dispute about a halfpennyworth of apples, and the chimney-
sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think proper to call upon them
for their evidence, could they refuse it? No, most certainly.
4 THE WORKS OFJEREMY BENTHAM 320-21 (1. Bowring ed., 1843) (quoted in Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688-89 & n.25 (1972)).
51 Folberg, supra note 46, at 319.
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one side more than the other.. Although the mediator may be
presenting an unbiased and accurate recitation of the facts, the
party against whom the testimony is offered may not see it that
way. 52 Under these circumstances, the party against whom the tes-
timony is offered may feel that the mediator is biased against him.
Such appearances (however unfounded) detract from the percep-
tion that the mediator is a neutral, disinterested party in whom the
disputants can confide.5  Thus, the availability of the mediator to
testify at later proceedings may inhibit a party from fully engaging
in the mediation process.54 More importantly, the fact that such
testimony has taken place may discourage later mediation partici-
pants from fully confiding in the mediators, a result that may un-
dermine the viability of court-annexed mediation."
In NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc.,56 the Ninth Circuit relied
heavily on the necessity for maintaining the appearance of media-
tor neutrality in finding a common law mediation privilege." The
52 See In the Matter of Tomlinson of High Point, Inc. and United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, 74 NLRB 681, 685 (1947) ("If conciliators were
permitted or required to testify about their activities, or if the production of notes or
reports of their activities could be required, not even the strictest adherence to purely
factual matters would prevent the evidence from favoring or seeming to favor one
side or the other.").
53 NLRB v.Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 55-56 (9th Cir. 1980); see NewYork
State Inspection v. New York State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 629 F. Supp. 33,
51 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
It is important to remember that the relevant interest that confidentiality pro-
tects with respect to the mediator is the appearance of impartiality, not the actuality
of impartiality. Even some commentators who profess to recognize this distinction
fail to keep it clear in their arguments. For example, in suggesting that maintaining
mediator neutrality does not provide a strong argument for confidentiality, Kevin Gib-
son argues that:
Thus, the claim is that if a mediator testifies about his or her percep-
tions within the mediation, at least one of the principals will perceive
the testimony as demonstrating that the mediator was biased during the
negotiations. But such a claim fails to recognize that the mediator may
have sufficient professional distance to remove him or herself to an im-
partial position when at work.
Kevin Gibson, Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral Reassessment, 1992 J. Disp. RESOL.
25, 46 (footnotes omitted). These two sentences address very different points. The
first sentence focuses on the appearance of impartiality while the second focuses on
actual impartiality. Although it may be true that the mediator is able to put aside any
preconceptions or biases, that does not necessarily mean that her subsequent testi-
mony will not cause one or more of the mediation participants to suspect or believe
that some favoritism or partiality existed.
54 Id.; see Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1245 (11th Cir. 1985).
55 See In the Matter of Tomlinson, 74 NLRB at 685.
56 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980).
57 Id. While some federal courts have recognized a federal mediation privilege,
that view is not universal. Compare Maine Cent. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Mainte-
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case concerned whether a NLRB hearing judge properly disal-
lowed the testimony of a Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser-
vice (FMCS) mediator. According to long-standing FMCS policy,
"mediators, if they are to maintain the appearance of neutrality es-
sential to successful performance of their task, may not testify
about the bargaining sessions they attend."58 Because the media-
tor's testimony was crucial to resolution of an important factual
dispute in the case, the court was required to decide whether that
policy was a sufficient basis, by itself, to quash the subpoena served
on the mediator. 9
To make that determination, the court applied the utilitarian
balancing test often applied to privileges.60 Protecting the media-
tor from testifying must have "'a public good transcending the nor-
mally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining truth."'6 1 In Dean Wigmore's words, the public inter-
est protected must be substantial, "because its admission would in-
jure some other cause more than it would help the cause of truth,
and because the avoidance of that injury is considered of more
consequence than the possible harm to the cause of truth."62
nance of Way Emps., 117 F.R.D. 485, 486-87 (D. Me. 1987) (applying Macaluso to find
privilege) with Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 673-75 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (declining to
recognize federal mediation privilege). Other courts have quashed deposition sub-
poenas served on mediators; however, it is not clear that the reason for doing so was
the recognition of a mediation privilege. See Port Arthur, Tex. v. United States, 517 F.
Supp. 987, 1003 n.105 (D.D.C. 1981).
58 Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 53.
59 Id. at 54.
60 The test usually applied is Dean John Henry Wigmore's four-part test, which
focuses on "the instrumental purpose of the communication and the cost/benefit
effect on the litigation process." ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 520 (1983). The four factors that must be satis-
fied are:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfac-
tory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of the litigation.
8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 (John T.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (footnote omitted). Although these criteria are open-
ended, Wigmore proposed a very narrow reading of this test. Note, Developments -
Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1450, 1472 (1985).
61 Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 54 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234
(1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
62 Id. at 54 (quoting 1J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 11, at 296 (1940)).
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Applying a balancing test, the court found the strong public
policy favoring federal mediators' perceived and actual impartiality
outweighed the benefits from enforcing the subpoena.63 In reach-
ing that result, the court relied heavily on the FMCS's own determi-
nation in their regulations that requiring mediators to testify would
decrease their effectiveness.64 The FMCS's regulations stress the
importance of "impartiality and integrity" in the mediation pro-
cess. Those goals are promoted when "[1]abor and management
or other interested parties participating in mediation efforts ...
have the assurance and confidence that information disclosed to
commissioners and other employees of the Service will not subse-
quently be divulged, voluntarily or because of compulsion, unless
authorized by the Director of the Service."6 5
The court's opinion in Joseph Macaluso broadly requires the
"complete exclusion of mediator testimony [to preserve] an effec-
tive system of labor mediation."' Once a party voluntarily agrees
to participate in an FMCS mediation, "that party must be charged
with acceptance of the restriction on the subsequent testimonial
use of the mediator."67 While this language is sweeping, it leaves
some room to find that the mediation privilege might yield in indi-
vidual cases.6 Indeed, implicit in the Ninth Circuit's use of a bal-
ancing test is the concept that while confidentiality is important, it
is not absolute. Like all privileges, a mediation privilege is an ex-
ception to the principle that the public is entitled to "every man's
evidence."69 The key policy question relevant to drafting an appro-
priate mediation privilege is where to draw the line between the
need for confidentiality and the need for disclosure under certain
circumstances.
Some commentators (foremost among them Professor Eric
Green) argue that a slightly modified version of Federal Rule of
Evidence 408 or similar state rules would be sufficient to protect
mediation confidentiality.7" Rule 408 states that:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish,
or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable
63 Id.
64 Id. at 55.
65 Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1401.2(a) (1979)).
66 Id. at 56.
67 Id.
68 Id. n.2. See, e.g., Drukker Communications, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd.,
700 F.2d 727, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
69 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323, 331 (1950).
70 Green, supra note 44, at 32.
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consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compro-
mise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not
require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable
merely because it is presented in the course of compromise ne-
gotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay,
or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution.71
The rule seeks to promote the strong public policy favoring the
compromise and settlement of disputes.72 Rule 408 accomplishes
that goal "by insulating the bargaining table from unnecessary in-
trusions."17  Rule 408 benefits the court system by reducing court
congestion and costs, by avoiding unnecessary lawsuits, and by plac-
ing the conduct of trials "on a more ethical footing" by requiring
fair play in pretrial maneuvers.
7 4
Rule 408 does not specifically mention mediation, but it is
probable that mediation will be considered the type of settlement
discussion that the Rule encompasses. 75 Rule 408, however, offers
limited protection. Rule 408 is not a privilege, it is an evidentiary
exclusion.7 6 Only the litigants at a trial or other proceeding for
which the Federal Rules of Evidence are applicable can invoke
71 FED. R EvID. 408.
72 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note (commenting that a basis for the
rule is "promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of
disputes"). See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse As-
soc., 800 F.2d 339, 344-46 (3d Cir. 1986); Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072, 1074
(5th Cir. 1976) (finding, in a pre-rules case, that due to burgeoning federal court
dockets, settlements promote the cause of justice). Rule 408 is also premised on the
ground that evidence of a compromise offer is not particularly relevant. FED. K EvID.
408 advisory committee's note ("The evidence is irrelevant, since the offer may be
motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of posi-
tion. The validity of this position will vary as the amount of the offer varies in relation
to the size of the claim and may also be influenced by other circumstances."). How-
ever, given the broad admissibility standard established in Rule 401, the better view is
that the main ground supporting Rule 408 is the encouragement of settlements.
73 Bottaro v. Hatton Assoc., 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); see Ramada Devel-
opment Co. v. Rauch, 644 F.2d 1097, 1106 (5th Cir. 1981).
74 2JAcK B. WErNSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 1 408[02] at
408-21-22 (Joseph T. McLaughlin ed., 1995).
75 See Green, supra note 44, at 15-19; (citing EEOC v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 489 F.
Supp. 1003, 1008 n.4 (D. Minn. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 661 F.2d 90 (8th Cir.
1981)); ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 1, at § 9:03.
76 ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 1, at § 9:04; see Green, supra note 44, at 17 (as-
serting that Rule 408 creates a "quasi-privilege").
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Rule 408 to prevent the admission of evidence from mediations. 7
Unlike a privilege, the rule does not prevent other disclosures.
Most importantly, Rule 408 does not protect confidential informa-
tion from discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.78
Rule 408 is also limited in that it does not exclude all evidence
of settlement discussions but, rather, only certain uses of the evi-
dence. The rule specifically states that evidence is inadmissible
only when offered to prove liability for a claim or the invalidity of
the claim or its amount.79 The rule allows evidence from compro-
mise negotiations to be used for another purpose, such as to show
bias or prejudice of a witness or to negate a contention of undue
delay.8" Many other uses not specifically listed in the rule are also
allowed.81
Although Rule 408 limits confidentiality in a number of im-
portant ways, Professor Green argues that no empirical evidence
exists to support the view that a broader privilege is needed for
mediation.8" Indeed, one could argue that settlements continue
unabated despite Rule 408's limitations. It is possible that because
Rule 408 expanded the common law rule, lawyers generally feel
more free in their settlement discussions. Alternatively, it is possi-
77 See FED. R. EVID. 1101.
78 See Bennett v. La Pere, 112 F.R.D. 136, 138-40 (D.R.I. 1986); Center for Auto
Safety v. Department ofJustice, 576 F. Supp. 739, 749 & n.23 (D.D.C. 1983); Manufac-
turing Systems, Inc. of Milwaukee v. Computer Tech., Inc., 99 F.R.D. 335, 336 (E.D.
Wis. 1983); but see Morse/Diesel Inc. v. Trinity Industries, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 80, 84
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that discovery of terms of settlement agreement requires a
"particularized showing of a likelihood that admissible evidence will be generated" by
dissemination of the information) (quoting Bottaro v, Hatton Assoc., 96 F.R.D. 158,
160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)).
79 Some courts have interpreted "liability" and "invalidity of a claim" narrowly. See
Thomas v. Resort Health Related Facility, 539 F. Supp. 630, 637-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
80 FED. R. EvID. 408.
81 See, e.g., Crues v. KFC Corp., 768 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir. 1985) (showing reason-
ableness); Vulcan Hart Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 718 F.2d 269, 277 (8th
Cir. 1983) (allowing admission of statements made to settle a claim not at issue in the
proceeding); Bituminous Construction, Inc. v. Rucker Enter., Inc., 816 F.2d 965, 969
(4th Cir. 1987) (showing understanding of obligations under an agreement); John-
son v. Hugo's Skateway, 949 F.2d 1338, 1345-46 (4th Cir. 1991) (showing motive or
intent); Catullo v. Metzner, 834 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st Cir. 1987) (showing breach of
fiduciary duty). For other permissible uses of such evidence see WEINSTEIN, supra
note 74, at 1 408[05].
82 Green, supra note 44, at 32. Some empirical data exists, however, outside the
mediation context indicating that people were less willing to talk about certain sub-
jects when they were told that no privilege protected the communications. Daniel W.
Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The P vilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psycho-
therapist-Patient Priviege, 60 N.C. L. Rv. 893 (1982). Moreover, mediators apparently
widely believe that confidentiality is an important ingredient necessary to promote
the growth of mediation. Hyman, supra note 27, at 21 n.5.
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ble that many attorneys are unaware of the loopholes to protection
of settlement negotiations.8" More likely, lawyers are aware of the
limitations of Rule 408's protections, and, as a result, they remain
circumspect in their communications with opposing counsel.
If this is the case, then the protections of Rule 408 do not
create the ideal environment for mediation. At least with respect
to court-annexed mediation programs, broader confidentiality pro-
visions can thus be seen as part of a commitment to foster greater
settlement of disputes without court intervention by taking steps to
provide an even more efficacious dispute resolution system than
that which exists in direct interparty negotiation. 4 Providing for
mediation confidentiality is thus just one part of the strong public
policy in favor of using mediation to address problems of delay and
cost in civil litigation. 85 As one court noted, "[a]lthough it is un-
clear whether the privilege acts in any primary sense to encourage
participation in the [mediation] program, it directly serves to in-
sure the effectiveness of the program and thereby, secondarily, it
serves to promote continued support for and existence of the
program. 86
Professor Green acknowledges that Rule 408 provides "uneven
and incomplete coverage."87 He argues, however, that a separate
mediation privilege is unnecessary because Rule 408 can be supple-
mented through contract or protective orders.88 Although these
methods of protecting confidentiality admittedly have problems,
Professor Green rejects the idea of a statutory or rule-based media-
tion privilege because he fears that these mediation privileges will
be drafted poorly. He states:
A blanket mediation privilege is a bad idea. Attempts by the
mediation community to obtain a statutory privilege may back-
fire. If the attempt is successful, an over-inclusive and under-
inclusive statute is likely to be enacted, resulting in the unin-
tended implication that some communications that ought to be
confidential were not intended to be protected, and that a back-
lash of public and judicial opinion against secrecy of events
83 See Jane Michaels, Rule 408: A Litigation Mine Field, 19 LIIGATION 34, 34 (Fall
1992).
84 See ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 1, at § 9:02 (suggesting the possibility of argu-
ing that "mediation is a last effort when negotiations between parties have faltered
and, but for broadened confidentiality, mediation would fail in this mission").
85 S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6804, 6817.
86 United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
87 Green, supra note 44, at 19.
88 Id. at 19-22, 25-29.
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should not be confidential. If the attempt at enactment of a
mediation privilege is unsuccessful, it may be understood as a
rejection of confidentiality protection for all mediations.89
Professor Green raises a number of valid points. First, he is
quite right to argue that an absolute, or "blanket," privilege is inap-
propriate. As is explored more fully in Section III, privileges
should not be absolute, and any attempt to provide total confiden-
tiality for mediation proceedings is ill-conceived. Judging from the
experience with other privileges, blanket protection is simply un-
necessary to protect either the zone of privacy necessary to engage
the parties fully in the mediation process or to protect the media-
tor's appearance as a disinterested neutral.
Professor Green's concern that such blanket privileges will be
promulgated has proved to be all too accurate, at least with respect
to the CJRA. The drafters of the CJRA-inspired mediation privi-
leges have for the most part failed to grapple with many of the
thorny drafting issues such privileges present. For example, to
what extent should the parties control the privilege? Should the
mediator also be entitled to invoke the privilege? What specific
exceptions, if any, should be included in the rule? Should the con-
fidentiality provision contain an explicit standard as to when confi-
dentiality should be overcome? These issues are simply left
unaddressed in most of the mediation privileges discussed below.
The fact that some (or even most) mediation privileges are
drafted poorly, however, does not mean that all drafting attempts
should cease. Rather, these poorly drafted privileges only demon-
strate the need to draft confidentiality provisions more carefully.
Indeed, more careful draftsmanship is really the only route that
remains open. As a practical matter, we are well past the stage
where we can leave protection of mediation confidentiality to the
parties and the courts through contracts and protective orders.
When Professor Green wrote his article, only fourteen states
had confidentiality statutes.9 0 That number has now grown to
forty-one.91 This, of course, does not even include the many privi-
leges, like those drafted as a result of the CJRA, that now exist in
local court rules. Thus, the strong trend appears to be toward ap-
plying extensive protection for mediation either statutorily or by
89 Id. at 35-36.
90 Id. at 15.
91 RoGERS & McEWEN, supra note 1, at § 9:33; see alsoJoshua P. Rosenberg, Note,
Keeping the Lid on Confidentiality: Mediation Privilege and Conflict of Laws, 10 OHio ST.J.
Disp. RESOL. 157, 158 (1994).
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court rule. The federal government has moved in the same direc-
tion. 2 It would be impracticable, if not impossible, to turn back
the clock and eliminate these provisions. Given these circum-
stances, the best approach to providing the appropriate level of
confidentiality for mediation is to analyze the mediation privileges
currently in existence and to propose amendments to make those
privileges function better.
Moreover, the judiciary's cautious approach to recognizing
new privileges may overly impede development of a mediation priv-
ilege.Y This hesitancy may undermine the strong public policy in
favor of promoting mediation and other forms of ADR as a means
to address problems of civil justice expense and delay.94 The
courts that recognize their own inadequacy in creating new privi-
leges also recognize that legislatures are best capable of creating
such privileges.95 Legislatures (and courts through their rulemak-
ing power) have undertaken that task with respect to mediation
privileges. Rather than abandoning those efforts, the better ap-
proach is to critique and improve them.
III. CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS UNDER THE CJRA PLANS
A review of the Plans and the local rules promulgated to im-
plement those Plans show that a number of districts made only
passing reference to ADR techniques. Some Plans merely indi-
cated that the court would encourage ADR.96 Others stated that
they would study ADR further.97 These Plans often made minimal
efforts, such as maintaining lists of court-approved neutrals in the
92 In 1990, Congress passed the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act to en-
courage federal agencies to use mediation and other forms of ADR. 5 U.S.C. § 571-93
(Supp. IV 1992). Section 574 of the statute recognizes the importance of mediation
confidentiality and creates specifically drafted mediation confidentiality protections.
5 U.S.C. § 574.
93 See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (declining to
create a privilege prohibiting disclosure of materials from peer reviews); United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (explaining that privileges are "not lightly created
nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth"); Smith
v. Smith, 154 F.R1D. 661, 673 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
94 See, e.g., supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
95 See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 189 ("The balancing of conflicting
interests of this type is particularly a legislative function.").
96 See, e.g., United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, Civil Jus-
tice Expense & Delay Reduction Plan § 6 (effective Dec. 1, 1993), reprinted in FEDERAL
LoCAL COURT RuLEs 770 (Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Supp. Apr. 1994) (herein-
after "LocAL Rui-Es").
97 See, e.g., United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, Civil
Justice Expense & Delay Reduction Plan § Three II(A) (effective Dec. 1, 1993), re-
printed in LoCAL RuLEs, supra note 96, at 1117.
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clerk's office or making available a pamphlet containing descrip-
tions of ADR alternatives.9" Some districts declined to adopt any
ADR procedures.99
A significant number of districts embraced some form of ADR.
Though some Plans stated that the district would refer cases to
ADR or implement some type of court-annexed program, they pro-
vided no information concerning the nature or operation of the
program. 00 These districts typically provided no further details on
their programs, and usually had no provision for confidentiality. °10
Other districts, however, went much further. These districts
enacted court-annexed ADR programs, including court-annexed
mediation programs.10 2 Some of these programs had been in exist-
ence before the CJRA. 10 3 The Plans or local rules describing these
98 See, e.g., United States District Courts for the Eastern and Western Districts of
Arkansas, Civil justice Expense & Delay Reduction Plan 11 (effective Dec. 30, 1991),
reprinted in LOCAL RuLEs, supra note 96, at 59 (pamphlet); United States District Court
for the District of Montana, Civil Justice Expense & Delay Reduction Plan app. I,
§ VI(B) (effective Apr. 1, 1992), reprinted in LocAL RuLEs, supra note 96, at 392 (list of
mediators); United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, Civil Justice
Expense & Delay Reduction Plan § 13 (effective Dec. 1, 1993), reprinted in LoCAL
RuLEs, supra note 96, at 980-81 (list of ADR resources).
9 United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Civil Justice Expense &
Delay Reduction Plan § I(I) (effective Dec. 13, 1991), reprinted in LocAL RuLES, supra
note 96, at 35-36; United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Civil
Justice Expense & Delay Reduction Plan § III(A) (6) (effective Dec. 31, 1991), reprinted
in LOCAL RULEs, supra note 96, at 1110.
100 United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Civil Justice Ex-
pense & Delay Reduction Plan § A, reprinted in LocAL RuLEs, supra note 96, at 790
("The Western Division of the Court at Dayton will undertake, within the limitations
of staff and funding, implementation of a formalized ADR program, such as Settle-
ment Week mediation using volunteer mediators."); U.S. Disr. CT. W. Disr. TENN.
LocAL R. 15(c) ("The court may order a settlement conference, an early neutral eval-
uation, a mini-trial, summary jury trial, or mediation by an attorney or retired
judge.").
101 It is possible that some of these districts may address confidentiality in local
standing orders, through mediation agreements entered into among the parties in
the cases referred to mediation or otherwise. This Article makes no attempt to can-
vass these other sources for mediation confidentiality provisions.
102 A number of courts use settlement conferences run either by the judge assigned
to the case, another judge or magistrate judge in the district, or a panel of volunteer
or paid attorneys. See, e.g., U.S. DiSr. CT. KAN. LOcAL R. 214; United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, Civil Justice Expense & Delay Reduction
Plan § IV(A) & App. 2 (effective Dec. 1, 1993), reprinted in LocAL RuLEs, supra note
96, at 800 & 805-10; U.S. DisT. Cr. MID. DIST. TENN. LocAL R. 20(D)(4)(c). This
Article will concentrate only on those programs specifically designated as mediation
programs.
103 See, e.g., United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Civil
Justice Expense & Delay Reduction Plan § VI (effective Dec. 1, 1993), reprinted in Lo-
cAL RuLEs, supra note 96, at 507.
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programs contain varying levels of detail concerning how the medi-
ation programs function.
Some of the Plans that mentioned confidentiality did so only
in passing, if at all. The Middle and Western Districts of North
Carolina are good examples.'04 These Plans, although quite spe-
cific in a number of respects, make limited provisions for confiden-
tiality and scatter those provisions throughout the rules. First, in
the Middle District of North Carolina, parties have the option of
submitting position papers to the mediator before the mediation
settlement conference. The "[p]osition papers are confidential,
shall be held so by the mediator, and need not be served on the
other parties."105 Second, both districts implicitly apply Federal
Rule of Evidence 408 to the mediation proceedings. 106 Third, both
districts require the mediator to describe the conditions under
which communications with the mediator will be held in confi-
dence during the conference, but fail to state the nature of those
conditions. 10 7
Other Plans do not even provide this minimum level of detail
concerning confidentiality. These Plans do not discuss the issue at
all, even though they establish court-annexed mediation pro-
grams.1 08 For example, the Southern District of California's Plan
provides for an experimental ADR program requiring district court
judges to order nonbinding arbitration or mediation in two types
of randomly chosen cases: (i) all even-numbered simple contract
or tort cases filed in the district where the judge finds that the po-
tential judgment does not exceed $100,000; and (ii) every even-
104 U.S. DIST. CT. MID. DIST. N.C. LocAL R. 602(a); United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina, Civil Justice Expense & Delay Reduction Plan
§ Four (I) (F) (2) (f)-(g) (effective Oct. 1, 1993), reprinted in LocAL RuLEs, supra note
96, at 762.
105 U.S. DIST. CT. MID. DIST. N.C. LocAL R. 605(c).
106 Id. at 605(f)(7) (requiring the mediator to inform parties that negotiating state-
ments and offers are inadmissible at trial); United States District Court for the West-
ern District of North Carolina, Civil Justice Expense & Delay Reduction Plan § Four
(I) (F) (2) (g) (effective Oct. 1, 1993), reprinted in LocAL RuLES, supra note 96, at 762
(same).
107 U.S. DIST. CT. MID. DIST. N.C. LocAL R. 605(0 (6); United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, Civil Justice Expense & Delay Reduction
Plan § Four (I) (F) (2) (f) (effective Oct. 1, 1993), reprinted in LocAL RULES, supra note
96, at 762.
108 These districts include Southern California and South Carolina. See, e.g., United
States District Court for the Southern District of California, Civil Justice Expense &
Delay Reduction Plan I (effective Oct. 18, 1991), reprinted in LocAL RuLEs, supra
note 96, at 110; United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Civil
Justice Expense & Delay Reduction Plan § VII(B) (1), reprinted in LocAL RuLEs, supra
note 96, at 960-61.
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numbered trademark and copyright case." 9 The Plan has no con-
fidentiality provision applicable to this mediation program. Some-
what incongruously, however, the Plan does provide that
mandatory Early Neutral Evaluation conferences are "off the rec-
ord, privileged and confidential.""'
Another district without a mediation confidentiality provision
is the Middle District of Alabama. The district's Plan establishes
"an informal, voluntary program through which appropriate cases
are referred to a senior district judge or the magistrate judges to
conduct mediation."' No mention is made of confidentiality.
However, "[e]ach senior district judge or magistrate judge is given
total discretion in how the [mediation] conferences are to be con-
ducted."' 12 Presumably, this power also includes the power to es-
tablish appropriate confidentiality requirements. Of course, any
confidentiality protection granted under this procedure may not
be as effective in promoting candor as a written confidentiality pro-
vision because a party may not be able to predict whether and to
what extent confidentiality will be enforced."1' The court's discre-
tion also should encompass the power to allow the parties to make
their own agreement concerning confidentiality. Such agreement,
however, is unlikely to be effective against requests from third par-
ties for information concerning the mediation.
There are a number of possible explanations for the lack of
any provision concerning confidentiality in these and other Plans.
Most simply, the advisory groups may not have considered the is-
sue. If the advisory groups considered the issue, then they may
have determined that the protections offered under Federal Rule
of Evidence 408, party agreements, or the provisions contained in
privately sponsored mediation contracts were sufficient. Alterna-
tively, the advisory group may have determined that a state media-
tion confidentiality statute would create sufficient confidentiality.
Whether this latter belief would be correct is at least debatable
given the limited protection offered by some state statutes'14 and
109 United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Civil Justice
Expense & Delay Reduction Plan I (effective Oct. 18, 1991), reprinted in LOCAL
RuLEs, supra note 96, at 110.
110 Id. at N(7) (ii), reprinted in LocAL RuLEs, supra note 96, at 111.
111 United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Civil Justice
Expense & Delay Reduction Plan VII (effective Dec. 1, 1993), reprinted in LocAL
RuLEs, supra note 96, at 4.
112 Id.
113 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 702-03 & n.39 (1972); ROGERS & McEWEN,
supra note 1, at § 9:10.
114 For example, some statutes only provide confidentiality provisions for specified
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the significant conflict of laws issue that arises from applying a state
statute to a federal court mediation program. 1 5 District courts
may have considered it inappropriate to adopt any detailed rules so
that they could maintain flexibility in administering ADR.11 6 Fi-
nally, districts may have considered their local rulemaking author-
ity inadequate to create a mediation privilege.1 1 7
In addition to the confidentiality provisions discussed above,
the Plans or Local Rules of at least eighteen districts contain sepa-
rate mediation confidentiality provisions of some variety.1 18 These
confidentiality provisions vary somewhat in wording and in the
scope of protection they offer, although there are many similarities
among them. For example, to protect against future disclosures,
mediation sessions are generally not recorded. 9 A number of the
mediation programs. See, e.g., N.Y.JUDICIARY LAW § 849-b(6) (McKinney 1992) (confi-
dentiality provision applicable to Community Dispute Resolution Centers program).
115 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 138, 139 (1971); Rosen-
berg, supra note 91, at 160.
116 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Civil Justice
Expense & Delay Reduction Plan App. I(D), reprinted in LOCAL RuLEs, supra note 96,
at 993 ("The court considered carefully all types of ADR now being practiced in vari-
ous districts across the country but rather than include specific details regarding ADR
in the Eastern District of Tennessee, the court felt it was important to maintain flexi-
bility as each specific case will require a judicially-tailored method of ADR.").
117 See FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (stating that courts may only adopt local rules to the extent
that they are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); but see Edwin
J. Wesely, The CivilJustice Reform Act; The Rules Enabling Act; the Amended Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; CJRA Plans; Rule 83 - What Trumps What, 154 F.R.D. 563 (suggesting
that the CJRA provides a legislative override of the Rules Enabling Act, thus allowing a
district to implement a plan inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
118 These districts are: the Northern District of Alabama; the Central District of
California; Connecticut; the Middle and Southern District of Florida; Massachusetts;
New Jersey; the Eastern District of North Carolina; the Northern District of Ohio; the
Western District of Oklahoma; Oregon; the Middle District of Pennsylvania; the
Northern and Southern Districts of Texas; Utah; the Virgin Islands; and the Eastern
and Western Districts of Washington. U.S. DIST. CT. N. DIST. ALA. LOCAL R. 83.2.10;
U.S. DIST. CT. CENT. DIST. CALIF. LOCAL R. 23.9; U.S. DIST. CT. CONN. LOCAL R. 36(5);
U.S. DIST. CT. MID. DIST. FLA. LOCAL R. 9.07(b); U.S. DIST. CT. S. DIST. FLA. LOCAL R.
16.2(G) (2); U.S. DisT. CT. MASS. LOCAL R. 16.4(C) (4) (f); U.S. DIST. CT. NJ. LOCAL R.
49(E) (4); U.S. DIST. CT. E. DisT. N.C. LOCAL R. 32.07(h); U.S. DIST. CT. N. DIST. OHIO
LOCAL R. 7:3.8; U.S. DIST. CT. W. DIST. OKLA. LOCAL R. 46(E) (5); U.S. DIST. CT. ORE.
LOCAL R. 240-2(d); U.S. DIST. CT. MID. DIST. PENN. LOCAL R. 1011.6(c)-(f); United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Civil Justice Expense & Delay
Reduction Plan § III(F) (effective Mar. 1, 1994), reprinted in LOCAL RULEs, supra note
96, at 1037; U.S. DIST. CT. S. DIST. TEX. LOCAL R. 22(I); U.S. DIST. CT. UTAH LOCAL R.
212(0 ) (9); United States District Court for the Virgin Islands, Civil Justice Expense &
Delay Reduction Plan § 2(4) (d)-(e) (effective Dec. 31, 1991), reprinted in LOCAL
RuLEs, supra note 96, at 1100; U.S. DIST. CT. E. DIST. WASH. LOCAL R. 39.1 (d) (3); U.S.
DIST. CT. W. DIST. WASH. LOCAL R. 39.1 (c) (5).
119 Such provisions exist in the districts of Northern Alabama, Middle and South-
ern Florida, Eastern North Carolina, Western Oklahoma, Oregon, Middle Penn-
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Plans also directly address the limitations inherent in Federal Rule
of Evidence 408 by providing that mediation communications are
not discoverable.' 20
There are also some drafting issues that the designers of these
provisions did not need to address. For example, there was no
need to define mediation to exclude other dispute resolution prac-
tices to which confidentiality was not meant to apply.12 1 If media-
tion is defined too broadly, then there is a danger that information
that should not be protected will be insulated from disclosure.' 22
These confidentiality provisions were drafted specifically and ex-
clusively for the districts' mediation programs. 23 Thus, there is no
danger that they will be applied to practices they were not in-
tended to cover.
On the whole, the confidentiality provisions adopted have
problems of over-inclusion and under-inclusion. This Article will
not attempt to analyze all of these provisions in detail. Instead, to
highlight at least some of the problems found in the rules, this
Article will examine three specific (but overlapping) problems:
sylvania, and Eastern and Western Washington. United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama, Civil Justice Expense & Delay Reduction Plan
§ IV(B)(11) (effective Dec. 1, 1993), reprinted in LoCAL RuLEs, supra note 96, at 20.5;
U.S. DIST. CT. MID. DIST. FLA. LOcAL R. 9.07(b); U.S. Disr. CT. S. DisT. FLA. LocAL .
16.2(G)(2); U.S. DIST. CT. E. DIST. N.C. LocAL R. 32.07(h); U.S. DiST. CT. W. DIST.
OKLA. LOCAL R. 46(E) (5); U.S. DIsT. CT. ORE. LocAL R. 240-2(d); U.S. Disr. CT. MID.
DisT. PENN. LocAL R. 1011.6(e); U.S. DIST. CT. E. Dis-r. WASH. LocAL R. 39.1 (d) (3);
U.S. DIST. CT. W. DIsT. WASH. LocAL R. 39.1(c) (5). In the Central District of Califor-
nia, the parties may consent to have the proceedings recorded. U.S. DIsT. CT. CENT.
DisT. CALIF. LocAL R. 23.9.
In programs where the mediation privilege is narrow or where there is no privi-
lege, mediators may take a practical step to create effective confidentiality for media-
tion sessions-they may dispose of all records relating to the hearings. See Friedman,
supra note 32, at 202. A mediation privilege preventing disclosure of documents is an
improvement over such ad hoc practices because if such a rule is in place, documents
will be preserved, possibly leading to improvements in program efficiency, continuity,
and research potential. See id.
120 These districts include Connecticut, Middle and Southern Florida, Massachu-
setts, Eastern North Carolina, Oregon and Eastern and Western Washington. U.S.
DisT. CT. CONN. LOCAL R. 36(5); U.S. DiST. CT. Mm. DiST. FLA. LoCAL R. 9.07; U.S.
DIST. CT. S. DIST. FLA. LocAL R. 16.2(G)(2); U.S. DIST. CT. MASs. LocAL R. 16.4(f);
U.S. DIST. CT. E. DIsT. N.C. LocAL R. 32.07(h); U.S. DIsT. CT. ORE. LOcAL R. 240-2(d);
U.S. DIST. CT. E. DIST. WASH. LocAL R. 39.1(d)(3); U.S. DIST. CT. W. DIST. WASH.
LoCAL R. 39.1 (c) (5).
121 See Hyman, supra note 27, at 19-22 (observing that without appropriate bounda-
ries, "confidentiality may intrude into such a wide variety of social transactions that it
would create severe and unwarranted hardships").
122 ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 1, at § 9:10.
123 In this regard, the CJRA-inspired provisions are similar to the majority of media-
tion privileges. See id. at § 9:12.
DRAFTING MEDIATION PRIVLEGES
(i) the existence of drafting problems that make the privileges un-
clear; (ii) the fact that absolute or near absolute privileges have
been drafted; and (iii) the lack of specification as to who controls
and may invoke the privilege.
Drafting problems are found in several of the privileges
promulgated under the auspices of the CJRA. For example, under
the rules applicable to the District of Connecticut's voluntary ADR
program (which includes mediation):
All ADR sessions shall be deemed confidential and protected by
the provisions of Fed. R. Evid. 408 and Fed. R Civ. P. 68. No
statement made or document produced as part of an ADR pro-
ceeding, not otherwise discoverable or obtainable, shall be ad-
missible as evidence or subject to discovery.' 24
This provision appears to be internally inconsistent. The first sen-
tence of the rule adopts Rule 408, which allows evidence from set-
tlement discussions to be used for certain purposes. 125 However,
the rule then contradicts itself in the next sentence by stating that
no statement made at the ADR session shall be admissible at all. 126
Is this provision a broad privilege or a limited evidentiary
exclusion?
Although troubling, such an obvious drafting error is not the
most serious concern with respect to these privileges. A court
faced with the more obvious drafting problems can likely resolve
them in a logical fashion. 127 For example, in Bennett v. Bennett,128
the Maine Supreme Court was asked to construe a Maine statute
which provided that any agreement reached during a mediation
must be reduced to writing."2 When the parties failed to reach
agreement, the court was required under the statute to determine
124 U.S. DIsT. CT. CONN. LocAL R. 36(5). The District of Massachusetts has a simi-
lar provision. U.S. DisT. CT. MAss. LocAL R 16.4(C) (4) (f); see also United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts, Civil Justice Expense & Delay Reduction
Plan Art. IV, Rule 4.03(d)(6) (effective Oct. 1, 1992), reprinted in LocAL RULES, supra
note 96, at 494.
125 See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
126 Professor Green notes that contract provisions stipulating mediation confidenti-
ality often have two purposes. First, the contract invokes Rule 408 in order to make
clear that the parties intended the rule to cover the mediation. Next, the contract will
"clarify the uncertainties and fill in the gaps in the evidence rule by directly address-
ing uncertain areas, such as... discoverability." Green, supra note 44, at 19. If the
second sentence of the Connecticut rule limited itself to discovery, then such a read-
ing would explain the rule. However, the addition of admissibility into the second
sentence adds nothing but confusion as to the scope of protection the rule offers.
127 See Bennett v. Bennett, 587 A.2d 463, 464 (Me. 1991).
128 587 A.2d 463 (Me. 1991).
129 19 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 665 (West 1964 & Supp. 1990).
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whether the parties had made a good faith effort to mediate.1 30 In
Bennett, one of the parties to a mediation claimed that an agree-
ment had been reached, although the parties did not reduce a set-
tlement to writing. Read literally, the statute required the court to
review the proceedings for good faith because the mediation
failed, even though no party claimed any bad faith participation. If
the court was required to make a far-ranging inquiry into good
faith participation each time mediating parties failed to reach
agreement, then many of the benefits of court-annexed ADR
would be lost. For example, dispute resolution proceedings would
no longer operate predominantly without court involvement.
Moreover, if the parties reasonably expected the court to review
the mediation proceedings in case of a failure to reach a settle-
ment, the candor necessary for successful mediations could be lost.
To avoid such a result, the Bennett court found that absent an
allegation of lack of good faith participation, the court would not
make the review called for in the statute."' Bennett demonstrates
that courts can make obvious adjustments to poorly drafted stat-
utes. Although it would be better if these problems were corrected
in the drafting process, these obvious flaws do not present the most
significant concern with respect to the confidentiality provisions
examined. A larger problem found in the majority of these provi-
sions is that they fail to give the court any guidance to aid it in
deciding whether to overcome the privilege in a particular case."3 2
This flaw is most clearly seen in the absolute, blanket privi-
leges. The vast majority of the confidentiality provisions are
drafted too broadly. These blanket privileges tend to provide no
definition of the terms they employ, making it somewhat unclear as
to the exact scope of coverage. For the most part, specific exclu-
sions from the privilege are rare and quite limited. Read literally,
some provisions seem to create inviolable protection from
disclosure.
Typical examples of broad, absolute provisions are found in
the Eastern and Western Districts of Washington. The Western
District local rules state:
All proceedings of the mediation conference, including any
statement made by any party, attorney or other participant,
130 Id.
131 587 A.2d at 464.
132 See Kevin Gibson, Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral Reassessment, 1992J. Disp.
RESOL. 25, 29 (1992) (criticizing SPIDR ethical standard regarding confidentiality be-
cause it does not provide criteria for determining in which cases confidentiality may
be overcome).
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shall, in all respects, be privileged and not reported, recorded,
placed in evidence, made known to the trial court or jury, or
construed for any purpose as an admission. No party shall be
bound by anything done or said at the conference unless a set-
tlement is reached, in which event the agreement upon a settle-
ment shall be reduced to writing and shall be binding upon all
parties to that agreement.'3
The Eastern District of Washington's rule is virtually identical.1 "
Evidence from a mediation is only admissible in these districts if
the parties reach a settlement and reduce that settlement to writ-
ing. In that case, the written agreement may be introduced in a
subsequent proceeding. 3 5 Such a rule is, of course, necessary to
ensure the enforceability of mediated agreements. Research has
revealed no other published opinions addressing whether other
disclosures are permitted under the rule. The court has empha-
sized, however, that absent a settlement agreement reduced to writ-
ing, "no evidence may be introduced under Local Rule
39.1(d) (3)."136 In such a case, a trial court may properly exclude
the testimony of the mediator as to whether a settlement had been
reached.' 3 7
On a superficial level, a mediation privilege such as this would
appear to work well. Indeed, other CJRA-inspired provisions follow
this relatively absolutist model." 8 These rules obviously create
broader protection than would exist under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 408. Unlike Rule 408, they prohibit all evidentiary uses of
mediation communications, including any attempts to impeach a
witness or to show bias or prejudice,13 9 as well as prohibiting disclo-
sures through discovery."4 If the drafters intended to provide a
zone of confidentiality in which candid settlement discussions can
133 U.S. DIST. CT. W. DIST. WASH. LocAL R. 39.1(c) (5).
134 U.S. DIST. CT. E. DIST. WASH. LocAL R. 39.1(d) (3).
135 Barnett v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 1989).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 These include the confidentiality provisions found in the district courts for Mid-
dle and Southern Florida, Eastern North Carolina, Oregon, and Northern and South-
ern Texas. See U.S. DIST. CT. MID. DIST. FLA. LocAL R. 9.07(b); U.S. Ds-r. CT. S. DIST.
FLA. LocAL 1L 16.2(G) (2); U.S. DIST. Cr. E. DIST. N.C. LocAL R. 32.07(h); U.S. DIST.
CT. ORE. LocAL R. 240-2(d); United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Civil Justice Expense & Delay Reduction Plan § III(F) (effective July 1, 1993),
reprinted in LocAL RuLEs, supra note 96, at 1037; U.S. DIST. CT. S. DIST. TEX. LoCAL R.
22(I).
139 FED. R. EVID. 408.
140 U.S. DIsT. CT. W. DIST. WASH. LOcAL R. 39(c) (5) (providing that "any statement
... shall, in all respects, be privileged").
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occur, then the rule seems to accomplish that goal. 1 4 1
The primary drawback to such absolute rules, however, is that
they are inaccurate and misleading. Privileges should not be abso-
lute, 142 and courts rarely treat them as being absolute.14  Read lit-
erally, however, a rule such as this seems to contemplate that there
are no circumstances sufficient to outweigh mediation confidenti-
ality. If such circumstances exist, they are not mentioned in the
rule. A judge deciding whether to uphold or overcome the privi-
lege is not given any information on the policy the privilege seeks
to promote or the relative weight to be given the privilege. It is this
failure to provide any guidelines for overcoming the privilege that
is the most troubling aspect of these blanket rules.
Apparently, absolute rules like these create a number of po-
tential dangers. First, a court may apply the statute literally to hold
that there are no circumstances that are of sufficient importance to
overcome the mediation privilege. 4 Such an interpretation could
lead to unjust results in subsequent civil or criminal proceedings.
Second, an unqualified privilege could lead to the backlash against
confidentiality Professor Green predicted. 4 Alternatively, a court
unwilling to provide absolute confidentiality for mediation com-
munications may interpret the privilege in so narrow a fashion that
the protections it offers are eviscerated.6
141 ROGERS & MGEWEN, supra note 1, at § 9:12.
142 The prevailing opinion among mediators seems to recognize that absolute privi-
leges are improper. SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION ("SPIDR"),
ETHIcAL STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSBELrY § 3 (1986) ("Maintaining confi-
dentiality is critical to the dispute resolution process. There may be some types of
cases, however, in which confidentiality is not protected."); see Gibson, supra note 132,
at 26-29 (noting that mediation confidentiality need not be absolute, but criticizing
SPIDR standard for failing to give criteria for overcoming privilege); see also Mori
Irvine, Serving Two Masters: The Obligation Under the Rules of Professional Conduct to Re-
port Attorney Misconduct in a Confidential Mediation, 26 RUTGER L.J. 155, 181-82 (1994);
Protecting Confidentiality, supra note 30, at 452.
143 See, e.g., supra note 60.
144 See, e.g., People v. Snyder, 492 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
145 Green, supra note 44, at 35-36.
146 A court may also simply avoid interpreting the scope of a blanket privilege. The
Virginia Supreme Court recently took this approach in Snyder-Falkinham v. Stock-
burger, 457 S.E.2d 36 (Va. 1995). In Snyder-Falkinham, the court was asked to decide
whether a trial court had improperly admitted evidence from a mediation session
held pursuant to Virginia's Dispute Resolution Program that tended to show that the
plaintiff had, in fact, agreed to a settlement of the underlying action. Id. at 38-39.
Virginia's statutory mediation privilege states, in part, that "[a]ny communication
made in or in connection with the dispute resolution proceeding which relates to the
controversy, whether made to the neutral or the dispute resolution program or to a
party, or to any other person if made at a dispute resolution proceeding, is confiden-
tial." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.10 (Michie Supp. 1994).
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In short, because no privileges are absolute, broadly written
confidentiality privileges such as these are an open invitation to
inconsistent interpretations of the scope of confidentiality. Some
decisions may construe the privilege too narrowly, thereby defeat-
ing the purpose of the confidentiality provision. Others will be too
broad, and may, as Professor Green suggested, create a backlash
against mediation confidentiality.
14 7
Another problem associated with such absolute privileges is
the question of who controls the privilege. In certain circum-
stances, someone may invoke another's privilege on behalf of that
person. For example, a lawyer may invoke the attorney-client privi-
lege on behalf of his client, but it is the client who ultimately con-
trols it and who may determine whether it should be waived.' 48 A
broadly-worded rule does not tell the judge either who may invoke
the privilege or who controls it. Analogizing to the attorney-client
privilege, a court may determine that if the mediation participants
waive the privilege, then they can require the mediator to testify.
As previously discussed, however, a separate testimonial and discov-
ery privilege is necessary to protect the mediator's appearance of
neutrality.'49 If the rule does not spell out whether the mediator
can refuse to testify or produce documents regardless of the par-
ties' consent, how is the court to know how to apply the rule in the
case before it?
The difficulties a court faces in construing absolute privileges
are well-illustrated in Fenton v. Howard,5 ° a case interpreting an Ar-
izona privilege applicable to conciliations of family disputes. The
case arose out of an auto accident in which the plaintiff alleged
emotional distress resulting from severe facial scarring sustained in
the accident. The plaintiff claimed his marriage began to deterio-
rate as a result of the scarring. He filed for dissolution of the mar-
riage, and later he and his wife participated in counseling through
The statute is not a true blanket privilege because it contains some exceptions to
confidentiality. None of the statutory exceptions, however, were applicable to the
question at issue, i.e., whether confidentiality is abrogated when there is a dispute
over the existence or meaning of an agreement allegedly reached as a result of the
mediation. Rather than determine whether the statute contained an implied excep-
tion to confidentiality in these circumstances or whether the statute should be inter-
preted according to its plain meaning so that the evidence would be excluded, the
Virginia Supreme Court avoided the issue by determining that the question had not
been properly preserved for appeal. Snyder-Falkinham, 457 S.E.2d at 39.
147 Green, supra note 44, at 35-36.
148 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343
(1985).
149 See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text.
150 575 P.2d 318 (Ariz. 1978).
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the Arizona Court of Conciliation. To obtain support for his emo-
tional distress claim, the plaintiff subpoenaed the assistant director
of the Court of Conciliation, seeking both deposition testimony
and documents relating to the counseling services.
The Arizona privilege statute provided only that all communi-
cations were confidential and could "not be disclosed without the
consent of the party making such communication." 151 Both plain-
tiff and his wife consented to the disclosures. The statute did not
specify whether the mediator was required to testify or produce
documents if the parties waived their privilege; nonetheless, the
lower court held that such consent did not cover the notes and
observations of the counselor.152 The Arizona Supreme Court de-
termined that the Conciliation Court may refuse to disclose mat-
ters even though not privileged under the statute if disclosure
would hamper the court in performing its functions.1 5 3 Because
the statute did support that holding, the court based its decision
on the "inherent power to do those things which are necessary for
the efficient exercise of its jurisdiction."5 4 The Arizona Supreme
Court then read into the statute a balancing test that weighed the
court's right to protect its ability to function effectively against the
need of the litigant for the information sought.
155
Although the majority's decision can be justified in terms of
protecting the effectiveness of the conciliation program, its ration-
ale for doing so was completely at odds with the language of the
statute. As a concurring justice noted in criticizing the majority's
reliance on the "inherent powers of the court" to justify its
decision:
The majority leave the impression that the Conciliation Court
system may be disrupted by requiring one of the conciliation
counselors to testify at a deposition, and of course a judge has
inherent power to prevent this. There is no suggestion or infer-
ence in the statute that the counselors of the Conciliation Court
are entided to any special treatment or have a personal privilege
protecting their so-called work product.1 56
This is, of course, the correct reading of the statute. As written, the
only privilege belongs to the parties participating in the concilia-
151 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-381.16(D) (1991).
152 Fenton, 575 P.2d at 320.
153 Id. at 320-21.
154 Id. at 320 (citation omitted).
155 Id. at 321.
156 Id. (Holohan, J., specially concurring).
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tion. 1'5 7 Had the drafters intended to grant the mediator a testimo-
nial privilege, they should have specified that result in the statute.
Otherwise, a court interpreting a privilege (such as the Arizona
statute or the Washington rule) may not know whether to grant
such a privilege to the mediator. Drafting a specifically delineated
privilege will tend to provide a more secure foundation for the
privilege.
There is a wide area of divergence among the CJRA-inspired
provisions concerning the extent to which the rules explicitly state
that the parties control the scope and continuing validity of the
confidentiality protections. The statutes often do not state, how-
ever, whether the mediator may control his own disclosures. For
example, in the Central District of California there is a significant
degree of party control.15 8 The local rules create a broad confiden-
tiality provision, but subject its protections to agreement of the
parties:
All settlement proceedings shall be confidential and no state-
ment made therein shall be admissible in any proceeding in the
case, unless the parties otherwise agree. No part of a settlement
proceeding shall be reported, or otherwise recorded, without
the consent of the parties, except for any memorialization of a
settlement. 159
To protect the atmosphere of candor necessary for successful
mediations, the drafters seem to have taken the view that subject-
ing a waiver of confidentiality to the agreement of all the parties
would create sufficient confidentiality. 60 But the provision ap-
pears inadequate in other ways. Again, this rule fails to indicate
what, if any, exceptions to confidentiality exist if the parties do not
agree to disclosure. Moreover, it is at best unclear whether the me-
diator may be required to testify if the parties agree, although the
rule suggests that such testimony would be permissible. Even
though both parties are willing to allow such testimony, the media-
tor's actual testimony may still create an appearance of partiality
that may be detrimental to the mediation program's continuing
viability.161
157 Id.
158 Most parties in the district are required to participate in one of four settlement
procedures. U.S. DisT. CT. CENT. DisT. CALt. LocAL R 23.2. The procedures include
"mediation-type settlement proceedings" before "a retired judicial officer or other
private or non-profit dispute resolution body[.]" U.S. DisT. CT. CENT. DIsT. CALm.
LocAL R. 23.5.3.
159 U.S. Disr. CT. CENT. DIST. CALiF. LocAL RL 23.9.
160 See ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 1, at § 9:12.
161 NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 55-56 (9th Cir. 1980).
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One confidentiality provision that attempts to address the
problem of protecting mediator neutrality is the one promulgated
in the Northern District of Alabama. 62 The Northern District of
Alabama's mediation confidentiality provision states:
The entire mediation process is confidential and by entering
into mediation the parties mutually covenant with one another
to preserve confidentiality on the basis established in this Plan.
The parties and the mediator may not disclose information re-
garding the process, except the terms of the settlement, to the
court or to third persons unless all parties agree.... The media-
tion process must be treated as a compromise negotiation for
purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence and State rules of
evidence. The mediator is disqualified as a witness, consultant,
attorney, or expert in any pending or future action relating to
the dispute, including actions between persons not parties to
the mediation process."6 '
The rule preserves party control, but limits that control by creating
an absolute disqualification for the mediator from being a witness
in any action relating to the dispute. Other courts have enacted
similar provisions.' 64 These rules posit that to protect neutrality, a
near absolute disqualification is necessary. 165 The Northern Dis-
trict of Alabama rule leaves some room for mediator disclosures
other than testimony.
As a practical matter, the Northern District of Alabama Plan
162 In the Northern District of Alabama, judges are required to conduct an ADR
conference during the early stages of a case to determine whether "the issues of the
case, the needs and relationships of the parties, and any other factors the court may
deem relevant" make ADR appropriate for potential resolution of the dispute.
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Civil Justice Ex-
pense & Delay Reduction Plan App. C, § III(B) (effective Dec. 1, 1993), reprinted in
LocAL RuLEs, supra note 96, at 19. Although the judge has the power to order ADR,
the "Plan contemplates that judges will not ordinarily order ADR over the objection
of a party." Id. at § II (A) (1) (d).
163 Id. at App. C, § IV(B)(10).
164 These include the districts of NewJersey, Northern Ohio, Western Oklahoma,
and Middle Pennsylvania. See U.S. DIST. CT. N.J. LocAL R. 49(E) (4) ("The mediator
shall not be subject to subpoena by any party."); U.S. DIST. CT. N. DIST. OHIo LoCAL
R 7:3.8 ("The Mediator is disqualified as a witness, consultant, attorney, or expert in
any pending or future action relating to the dispute, including actions between per-
sons not parties to the mediation process."); U.S. DIST. CT. W. DisT. OKLA. LocAL R.
46(E) (5) ("The mediator may not be required to testify in any proceedings relating to
or arising out of the matter in dispute or be subject to process requiring disclosure of
confidential information or data relating to or arising out of the matter in dispute.");
U.S. DIsT. CT. MID. Disr. PENN. LocALI. 1011.6(0 ("The mediator shall not be called
as a witness at trial.").
165 In this way, the drafters of these rules reached the same policy determination as
the Ninth Circuit in the Joseph Macaluso case. SeeJoseph Macaluso, 618 F.2d at 56.
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avoids one area about which the mediator might reasonably be ex-
pected to testify, i.e., whether the parties participated in good faith
in the mediation. The Plan "contemplates that judges will not or-
dinarily order ADR over the objections of a party."166 Where both
parties have agreed to participate in the process, it seems unlikely
in most cases that they will not participate in good faith thereafter.
Again, however, the absolutes created in this rule seem over-
broad. For example, the rule would prohibit the mediator from
disclosing information she was statutorily required to report unless
she obtained the consent of all parties to the mediation. In most
cases, it is likely that such permission would not be forthcoming.
In that situation, the court would have to decide whether confiden-
tiality should remain in effect. Like the other provisions discussed,
the Northern Alabama rule does not give the court any guidelines
for making that decision.
The District of New Jersey's confidentiality provision provides
a variant on the party-control model.'67 The NewJersey confidenti-
ality rule provides that:
All information presented to the mediator shall, on request, be
deemed confidential and shall not be disclosed by anyone, in-
cluding the mediator, without consent, except as necessary to
advise the Court of an apparent failure to participate. The me-
diator shall not be subject to subpoena by any party. No state-
ments made or documents prepared for mediation shall be
disclosed in any subsequent proceeding or construed as an
admission. 
68
Like the Northern District of Alabama, confidentiality is subject to
party control. In New Jersey, however, confidentiality is not auto-
matic-it is contingent upon request of the parties. 69 Such a pro-
166 United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Civil Justice
Expense & Delay Reduction Plan § HI(A) (1) (d) (effective Dec. 1, 1993), reprinted in
LocAL RuLEs, supra note 96, at 9.
167 New Jersey's local court rules allow each judge and magistrate to refer, without
the consent of the parties, two complex civil actions to mediation. U.S. DiSrT. CT. N.J.
LocAL R. 49(D).
168 U.S. DiST. CT. N.J. LocAL R. 49(E)(4).
169 The District of New Jersey's mediation rules are inconsistent on this point.
Although Rule 49 requires a request for confidentiality, that requirement is not con-
tained in the district's Guidelines for Mediation, which appear as Appendix P of the
local rules. The Guidelines state only that:
Neither the parties nor the mediator may disclose any information
presented during the mediation process without consent. The only ex-
ception to this rule of confidentiality is when disdosure may be neces-
sary to advise the compliance judge of an apparent failure to participate
in the mediation process.
U.S. DIST. CT. N.J. LocAL R. App. P (Guidelines for Mediation).
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vision may disadvantage less sophisticated parties who might not be
aware of the confidentiality option.170
The mandatory nature of the New Jersey program creates an
important exception not included in other programs. The New
Jersey rules require that "l[c] ounsel and the parties in each civil
action referred to mediation shall participate therein and shall co-
operate with the mediator."1 71 To enforce that requirement, the
New Jersey rule allows the mediator or another party to report a
failure to participate to the court. 172 Other districts have similarly
limited confidentiality. 171 Such provisions, however, are not with-
out potential problems. If interpreted too broadly, such provisions
could ameliorate the protections provided by the rule. 174 For this
reason, many of the CJRA-inspired rules provide that information
concerning the mediation proceedings cannot be revealed to the
court. 175
The discussion thus far sufficiently demonstrates at least some
of the potential pitfalls in drafting mediation privileges. Although
these pitfalls are common among the CJRA-inspired provisions,
they can be remedied.
IV. AN ALTERNATE APPROACH TO MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY
Even though the various confidentiality provisions adopted as
a result of the CJRA are both underinclusive and overinclusive, this
does not mean that statutory or rule-based mediation privileges
should be rejected. More careful drafting can cure most of the
problems with the confidentiality provisions discussed above. In-
deed, the primary problem with the CJRA-inspired provisions is the
lack of guidance they provide to a court in determining what, if
any, exceptions to recognize and how to resolve the tension be-
tween the need for some disclosures and the recognized need for
confidentiality in mediation. That problem is not adequately re-
170 But see Hyman, supra note 27, at 29 ("An explicit agreement [to impose confi-
dentiality] prevents inexperienced parties from blindly subjecting themselves to a
complicated set of privileges and exceptions.").
171 U.S. DIST. CT. N.J. LocAL R. 49(E)(1).
172 Id.; cf Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reasoning that
it was proper in a mandatory mediation program for a mediator recusing himself
from case to report to the judge "in a general way" on the past course of the media-
tion and to make suggestions on future course of mediation).
173 See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. E. DIST. N.C. LocAL R. 32.09(0; U.S. DIST. CT. MID. DIST.
PENN. LocAL R. 1011.6(b), (d).
174 See Bennett v. Bennett, 587 A.2d 463, 464 (Me. 1991).
175 See, e.g., U.S. DIST. CT. W. DIsT. WASH. LocAL R. 39.1(c) (5).
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solved if mediation confidentiality provisions are abandoned.176
The absence of any mediation privilege places the court in a simi-
lar position to the one that it occupies when it interprets a broadly
worded mediation confidentiality provision like those cited above.
There are a number of possible policies which a mediation privi-
lege could seek to foster. A rule may seek to create an atmosphere
of candor to promote communications between the parties, may
seek to protect the appearance of mediator neutrality, or may seek
to do both. Without a well-drafted rule, judges are left to deter-
mine which of these policies to consider. The court must fend for
itself in determining the proper factors to consider when it is asked
to create an exception and the proper balancing test to apply to
the situation. This situation is rife with the possibility of inconsis-
tent decisions concerning the scope of the privilege, which may
undermine the efficacy of any privilege that is recognized.
There are three possible alternatives to the blanket privileges
that predominate in the CJRA programs. Only one of those alter-
natives adequately balances the need for certainty and the need to
provide courts with guidance on how to interpret or, if necessary,
overcome the confidentiality provision. One solution that does not
work is to create a flexible privilege that gives courts wide discre-
tion to qualify the privilege on a case-by-case basis. Such a flexible
standard is an improvement over no privilege at all because it
removes the possibility that no privilege will be recognized and be-
cause such a standard is likely to describe in some way the policy or
policies the confidentiality provision seek to promote. Leaving res-
olution of confidentiality to case-by-case analysis, however, may give
rise to the same problems of inconsistent interpretation that arise
when no privilege is created. Inconsistency could limit the effec-
tiveness of the privilege by making it harder for mediation partici-
pants to predict whether their statements will remain
confidential.177 Indeed, such a rule leaves open to inconsistent in-
terpretation issues as to which there already may be significant con-
sensus. For example, if it is generally agreed that position papers
specifically prepared for the mediation should be confidential,
there seems to be no reason why the confidentiality rule should
not spell that out clearly.' 78
176 See Green, supra note 44, at 29-30 (suggesting that courts should employ a public
policy approach).
177 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 702-03 & n.39 (1972); ROGERS & McEwEN,
supra note 1, at § 9:10; see also Friedman, supra note 32, at 207 (noting that confidenti-
ality provisions need to be clearly defined if they are to be of practical value).
178 See U.S. DIsT. CT. MID. DIST. N.C. LocAL IK 605(c).
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The second possible solution is to draft a broad confidentiality
rule with specific exceptions.179 Such a rule is an improvement
over the broad provisions drafted under the CJRA because it ex-
plicitly recognizes that no privilege rule is absolute. A superficially
absolute rule is deceptive in light of the balancing that is a neces-
sary part of privilege analysis.18 0 Such a rule is a "snare and a delu-
sion" for those who do not recognize the uncertainty inherent in
privileges." A rule that delineates exceptions to confidentiality
may also eliminate some of the possibility for inconsistent
interpretations.
These gains come only with a significant cost: the elimination
of flexibility. It is unlikely that the drafters will be able to antici-
pate all of the factual scenarios in which abrogation of confidenti-
ality might be important. Even if these scenarios could be
anticipated, it would seem equally unlikely that they would be sus-
ceptible to precise codification. If an appropriate circumstance for
disclosure arose for which there was no provisions in the rule's ex-
ceptions, then significant hardship might result. In this case, an
inflexible but certain rule may tend to be either overinclusive or
underinclusive and, thus, may not promote the policies underlying
the privilege. 8 Inflexibility might also cause the court to allow
disclosure by stretching the exceptions in the rule. Such a result
might invite future courts to alter significantly the confidentiality
scheme the drafters intended to implement.
The better solution is to combine these two approaches. Such
a provision will contain a broad rule of confidentiality that creates
a presumption of confidentiality for mediation sessions. The rule
will provide the court with specific exceptions to that confidential
treatment. More importantly, the rule will create an appropriate
balancing test that will allow the court sufficient discretion to ad-
dress individual situations the drafters may not have contemplated
without allowing the court too much room to alter the privilege
scheme. 183
179 See, e.g., Hyman, supra note 27, at 30-31.
180 See supra note 60.
181 CHARUS McCoRMICK, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 105 (Edward W. Cleary et al.
eds., 3d ed. 1984); see also Simrin v. Simrin, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (Dist. Ct. App.
1965) (recognizing that "[f)or the unwary spouse who speaks freely, repudiation [of a
confidentiality agreement applicable to marriage counseling] would prove a trap; for
the wily, a vehicle for making self-serving declarations").
182 Note, Developments-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1450, 1487-88
(1985).
183 Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 134 (1995) (noting that statutory
rules, as opposed to standards, limit to some degree judicial discretion).
[Vol. 26:1
DRAFTING MEDIATION PRIVILEGES
The likely result of such an approach is a complex rule or stat-
ute. Although such complexity is not a virtue, it may be necessary
given the complexity of the mediation confidentiality issue.1 84
Such complexities may also sacrifice some certainty in the applica-
tion of the rule and thereby cause the parties to rely less on the
protection the rule offers and to be more circumspect in media-
tions. This result, however, is not inevitable. Because no privilege
is absolute, a flexible rule establishes its exceptions (or standards
for exceptions) ex ante rather than leaving them for ex post determi-
nation by the court. Thus, parties can still determine with some
reasonable certainty the probability of most disclosures. Moreover,
to the extent that the statute creates a sufficiently high hurdle for
disclosure, it may discourage litigants from routinely seeking dis-
closure, an effect that should also promote greater security that
disclosures will remain confidential.1 85
An example of a mediation confidentiality provision that es-
tablishes such a compromise between apparent certainty and flexi-
bility is contained in the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of
1990 (ADR Act).186 Congress passed the ADR Act to encourage
federal agencies to use mediation and other forms of ADR. Sec-
tion 574 of the statute recognizes the importance of mediation
confidentiality and creates specifically drafted mediation confiden-
tiality protections.1 87 The ADR Act's protections were "created to
enable parties to ADR proceedings to be forthcoming and candid,
without fear that frank statements may later be used against
them."188
Section 574 avoids many of the drafting problem found in the
CJRA provisions. As a general rule, the statute is similar to the
CJRA-inspired provisions in that it creates broad confidentiality
protection for mediation communications. The statute states that
parties and mediation neutrals "shall not voluntarily disclose or
through discovery or compulsory process be required to disclose
any information concerning any dispute resolution
communication." 89
184 Green, supra note 44, at 8; see generally Hyman, supra note 27 (analyzing complex
mediation privilege rule).
185 Developments, supra note 182, at 1489.
186 5 U.S.C. §§ 571 to 593 (Supp. IV 1992).
187 5 U.S.C. § 574. This section appears in the Appendix to this Article, along with
certain relevant defined terms.
188 S. REP. No. 543, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N.
3931, 3941.
189 5 U.S.C. §§ 574(a), (b). Section 571(5) defines "dispute resolution communica-
tion" as follows:
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Unlike many of the provisions contained in the Plans, how-
ever, section 574 does not stop with creating this broad privilege.
The section creates carefully crafted exceptions to the scope of me-
diation confidentiality through the use of specific exclusions. For
example, section 574 allows disclosure where the need for confi-
dentiality no longer exists, such as where a "dispute resolution
communication has already been made public." 190
The statute also builds in flexibility by providing the court with
a framework for evaluating disclosure issues not specifically enu-
merated in the statute. A court is permitted to order both neutrals
and parties to disclose such communications if disclosure is neces-
sary to: "(i) prevent a manifest injustice; (ii) help establish a viola-
tion of law; or (iii) prevent harm to the public health or safety."1 91
Disclosures sought for these reasons are subject to a balancing test:
the alleged necessity for the disclosure must be of "sufficient mag-
nitude in the particular case to outweigh the integrity of dispute
resolution proceedings in general by reducing the confidence of
parties in future cases that their communications will remain confi-
dential." 92 This balance is broad enough to encompass both inter-
ests which a mediation privilege should protect-the creation of a
zone of privacy and the protection of the appearance of mediator
neutrality.
In this manner, the section goes a long way toward preventing
inconsistent court rulings. Unlike a number of the Plan provisions,
the statute does not create apparently absolute protection. In addi-
tion to specific enumerated exclusions from confidentiality, the
statute provides the court with three general areas where disclosure
may be allowed. Although it is certainly possible for a court to
broadly construe phrases such as "manifest injustice,""9 ' the rule
hems in the court to a certain degree. Section 574 tells the court
how it should weigh disclosure and confidentiality. The court is
directed not only to consider the individual case at hand, but also
[A] ny oral or written communication prepared for the purposes of a
dispute resolution proceeding, including any memoranda, notes or
work product of the neutral, parties or nonparty participant; except that
a written agreement to enter into a dispute resolution proceeding, or
final written agreement or arbital award reached as a result of a dispute
resolution proceeding, is not a dispute resolution communication.
Id. at § 571(5).
190 5 U.S.C. §§ 574(a) (2), 574(b) (3).
191 5 U.S.C. §§ 574(a) (4), 574(b) (5).
192 Id.
193 See Hyman, supra note 27, at 41 (explaining that an exception for "manifest
injustice" would "swallow the rule" if construed too broadly).
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to consider the broader effect that disclosure will 'have on the effi-
cacy of future dispute resolution proceedings. This section thus
gives the court the necessary parameters it needs to balance the
inevitable tension between confidentiality and disclosure.
The flexibility built into this provision allows a court to deal
with unusual situations not addressed in the specific exceptions.
For example, the court's ability to allow disclosure to "prevent a
manifest injustice" would permit the court to allow disclosure to
address any abuse of the mediation process or other fraud, bad
faith, or illegal conduct. 194 The court can use the same exception
in cases implicating a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
confrontation or compulsory process. 95 The exception for viola-
tions of law and the prevention of harm to public safety or health
are important in public interest cases where mediation confidenti-
ality has been a particular concern. 196
The statute also protects the status of mediation neutrals by
establishing separate standards for compelling disclosures from
them as opposed to parties.'97 In this way, the statute recognizes
that maintaining the appearance of mediator neutrality is an addi-
tional important consideration with respect to disclosures from
neutrals.198 Thus, while disclosure may be required from both neu-
trals and parties where required by statute, "a neutral should make
such communication public only if no other person is reasonably
available to disclose the communication."' 99 A party may disclose if
194 Green, supra note 44, at 29 (commenting that a statute without such exceptions
is overbroad).
195 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
It is not clear that a mediation privilege must yield in all criminal cases. In United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974), the Court found that claims of executive
privilege were insufficient to prevent disclosure pursuant to a grand jury subpoena.
There, the Court held that:
when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized inter-
est in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands
of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The
generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, spe-
cific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Id. However, when there has not been such a demonstrated, specific need, the exist-
ence of a mediation privilege may provide a sufficient basis to quash a grand jury
subpoena. United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
196 See, e.g., Harter, supra note 43, at 341; Thomas S. Leatherbury & Mark A. Cover,
Keeping Public Mediation Public: Exploring the Conflict Between Confidential Mediation and
Open Government, 46 SMU L. lRv. 2221 (1993).
197 5 U.S.C. § 574(a). See also Hyman, supra note 27, at 33-34.
198 See generally NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980).
199 5 U.S.C. § 574(a) (3).
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all parties to the proceeding consent, but a neutral may only dis-
close if, in addition, she and any affected nonparties consent as
well.20 ' The ADR Act also addresses a common area where the me-
diator's testimony might be sought-the situation where a dispute
resolution communication is relevant to resolving a dispute over
the existence or meaning of an agreement.201 In that situation,
confidentiality is waived only with respect to the parties. The medi-
ator may not testify or produce documents unless she consents to
do so. 2 02
The statute is not perfect by any means. First, the statute is
long and complex, which may make it difficult for unsophisticated
parties who may not have legal representation to understand it.
Although this complexity is a drawback, section 574 is by no means
the only example of a complex mediation privilege. Other privi-
leges proposed by the American Bar Association20 3 and other medi-
ation experts2 o are equally complex. Such complexity may well be
a necessary evil when attempting to draft an appropriately flexible
and inclusive privilege.
Section 574 is also not free from inappropriate limitations on
the scope of confidentiality. Section 574 provides that the "parties
may agree to alternative confidential procedures for disclosures by
a neutral."20 5 This provision may not adequately protect the ap-
pearance of mediator neutrality. Although the parties may not
question the appropriateness of the mediator testifying before the
mediation begins, their view of whether the mediator is testifying
impartially may change after the mediator actually takes the stand.
Moreover, allowing the parties to alter the scope of confidentiality
raises the possibility that sophisticated parties may be able to take
advantage of their unsophisticated opponents. The statute limits
that possibility by providing that the parties must inform the medi-
200 Id. at § 574(a) (1) (providing that a neutral may not disdose unless "all parties
to the dispute resolution proceeding and the neutral consent in writing, and, if the
dispute resolution communication was provided by a nonparty participant, that par-
ticipant also consents in writing").
201 Id. at § 574(b) (6). This subsection also applies to "determining the existence or
meaning of an ... award that resulted from the dispute resolution proceeding or to
the enforcement of such an agreement or award[.]"
202 Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 574(a)(1).
203 See American Bar Association Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution Report to the
House of Delegates, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 65 (1988).
204 See Symposium Rule: Confidentiality in Mediation, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 71
(1988).
205 5 U.S.C. § 574(d); see also Hyman, supra note 27, at 30 (suggesting a similar
rule).
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ator of any modifications to the confidentiality scheme."° ' The me-
diator apparently may not take any steps to alter such an
agreement; she may, however, be able to point out the implications
of the agreement to the unsophisticated party.
The parties may also circumvent other protections of mediator
neutrality in the statute. Section 574 provides that confidentiality
is waived as to the parties (but not as to the neutral) when "the
dispute resolution communication is relevant to determining the
existence or meaning of an agreement or award that resulted from
the dispute resolution proceeding or to the enforcement of such
an agreement or award."2 0 7 If, however, the parties publicly dis-
close the relevant dispute resolution communications, the neutral
may be required to testify. This may result because section 574 also
abrogates the privilege as to the neutral where the dispute resolu-
tion communication has already been made public. 08 These pro-
visions may not adequately protect the appearance of mediator
neutrality. A better result would be to limit these exceptions. In
this way, a mediator could still testify concerning the scope or exist-
ence of a mediated agreement, but only in cases where the court
determines that such testimony is necessary to prevent a manifest
injustice.20 9
At least one clear drafting error also exists in the statute. The
statute provides that the parties are permitted to disclose a dispute
resolution communication if the communication "was provided to
or was available to all parties to the dispute resolution proceed-
ing."210 As written, it would allow disclosure of a document or oral
communication made for purposes of mediation only. For exam-
ple, if a party made a statement at the mediation that he thought
his claim was worth $100,000, that statement could presumably be
disclosed since it was "available to all parties to the dispute resolu-
tion proceeding." This reading cannot be correct because, if it
were, section 574 would offer less protection then Federal Rule of
Evidence 408.
If these problems can be corrected, section 574 would provide
a good example of a well-drafted mediation confidentiality provi-
sion. Unlike the provisions adopted in some of the Plans, section
574 creates an atmosphere of candor necessary for successful medi-
206 Id.
207 5 U.S.C. § 574(b) (6).
208 See id. at § 574(a) (2).
209 See id. at § 574(a) (4) (A).
210 Id. at § 574(b) (7).
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ation and protects mediator impartiality without creating an over-
inclusive privilege.
CONCLUSION
The CJRA has achieved an important goal-it has prompted
courts to experiment with alternative procedures for resolving dis-
putes, including mediation programs. Those programs have the
potential to reduce significantly the problems of expense and delay
the CJRA sought to address. To achieve that goal, however, the
mediation programs need to be well thought out. As courts con-
tinue to evaluate these experimental mediation programs, they
should re-evaluate the issue of mediation confidentiality. Those
courts that have failed to adopt any confidentiality rule should seri-
ously consider doing so. Those that already have a rule should
consider whether it properly protects mediation confidentiality.
The mediation confidentiality rules created in response to the
CJRA vary widely in the scope of protection they afford. Some pro-
visions are overinclusive; they create absolute or near-absolute pro-
tection for mediation communications while failing to provide for
any exceptions to confidentiality. These provisions also typically
fail to give the court any guidance as to the appropriate factors it
should consider in deciding whether to overcome the privilege.
Other provisions are underinclusive, or are poorly drafted, making
it unclear what information is protected.
These problems should be of great concern. They may give
rise to significant disputes in the future. Moreover, to the extent
that they fail to create the proper atmosphere of candor necessary
for successful mediations, these provisions may discourage parties
from participating in mediation. Such a result is antithetical to the
purposes for which the CJRA was enacted.
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APPENDIX I
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
§ 571. Definitions.
For the purposes of this subchapter, the term -
(7) "in confidence" means, with respect to information, that
the information is provided -
(A) with the expressed intent of the source that it not be disclosed;
or
(B) under circumstances that would create the reasonable expec-
tation on behalf of the source that the information will not be
disclosed[.]
§ 574. Confidentiality.
(a) Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e), a neutral in
a dispute resolution proceeding shall not voluntarily disclose or
through discovery or compulsory process be required to disclose
any information concerning any dispute resolution communica-
tion or any communication provided in confidence to the neutral,
unless -
(1) all parties to the dispute resolution proceeding and the neu-
tral consent in writing, and, if the dispute resolution communica-
tion was provided by a nonparty participant, that participant also
consents in writing;
(2) the dispute resolution communication has already been made
public;
(3) the dispute resolution communication is required by statute to
be made public, but a neutral should make such communication
public only if no other person is reasonably available to disclose the
communication; or
(4) a court determines that such testimony or disclosure is neces-
sary to -
(A) prevent a manifest injustice;
(B) help establish a violation of law; or
(C) prevent harm to the public health or safety, of sufficient
magnitude in the particular case to outweigh the integrity of dis-
pute resolution proceedings in general by reducing the confidence
of parties in future cases that their communications will remain
confidential.
(b) A party to a dispute resolution proceeding shall not volun-
tarily disclose or through discovery or compulsory process be re-
quired to disclose any information concerning any dispute
resolution communication, unless -
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(1) the communication was prepared by the party seeking
disclosure;
(2) all parties to the dispute resolution proceeding consent in
writing;
(3) the dispute resolution communication has already been made
public;
(4) the dispute resolution communication is required by statute to
be made public;
(5) a court determines that such testimony or disclosure is neces-
sary to -
(A) prevent a manifest injustice;
(B) help establish a violation of law; or
(C) prevent harm to the public health and safety, of sufficient
magnitude in the particular case to outweigh the integrity of dis-
pute resolution proceedings in general by reducing the confidence
of parties in future cases that their communications will remain
confidential;
(6) the dispute resolution communication is relevant to determin-
ing the existence or meaning of an agreement or award that re-
sulted from the dispute resolution proceeding or to the
enforcement of such an agreement or award; or
(7) the dispute resolution communication was provided to or was
available to all parties to the dispute resolution proceeding.
(c) Any dispute resolution communication that is disclosed in
violation of subsection (a) or (b), shall not be admissible in any
proceeding relating to the issues in controversy with respect to
which the communication was made.
(d) The parties may agree to alternate confidential proce-
dures for disclosures by a neutral. Upon such agreement the par-
ties shall inform the neutral before the commencement of the
dispute resolution proceeding of any modifications to the provi-
sions of subsection (a) that will govern the confidentiality of the
dispute resolution proceeding. If the parties do not so inform the
neutral, subsection (a) shall apply.
(e) If a demand for disclosure, by way of discovery request or
other legal process, is made upon the neutral regarding a dispute
resolution communication, the neutral shall make reasonable ef-
forts to notify the parties and any affected nonparty participants of
the demand. Any party or affected nonparty participant who re-
ceives such notice and within 15 calendar days does not offer to
defend a refusal of the neutral to disclose the requested informa-
tion shall have waived any objection to such disclosure.
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(f) Nothing in this section shall prevent the discovery or ad-
missibility of any evidence that is otherwise discoverable, merely
because the evidence was presented in the course of the dispute
resolution proceeding.
(g) Subsections (a) and (b) shall have no effect on the infor-
mation and data that are necessary to document an agreement
reached or order issued pursuant to a dispute resolution
proceeding.
(h) Subsections (a) and (b) shall not prevent the gathering of
information for research or educational purposes, in cooperation
with other agencies, governmental entities, or dispute resolution
programs, so long as the parties and the specific issues in contro-
versy are not identifiable.
(i) Subsections (a) and (b) shall not prevent the use of a dis-
pute resolution communication to resolve a dispute between the
neutral in a dispute resolution proceeding and a party to or partici-
pant in such proceeding, so long as such dispute resolution com-
munication is disclosed only to the extent necessary to resolve such
dispute.
(j) This section shall not be considered a statute specifically
exempting disclosure under section 552(b) (3) of this tide.
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